EAS p-Nitroacetanilide Essay

Pinacol was converted to pinacolone in the experiment at a 15.60% yield. A low percent yield was expected due to the experimental distillation and experimental separation of the two layers. Some pinacolone could have been trapped in the aqueous layer due to experimental error at separating via a pipet. The IR showed peaks at 2967, 2906, 2871, 2359, 2337, 2173, and 1989. The representative peaks in an IR of pinacolene are present between 3000 and 1700. The NMR when manipulated with a multiple of three, showed the presence of 9 hydrogens at 1.2 ppm and 3 hydrogens at 2.1 ppm. The typical NMR for pinacolone shows peaks around 20, 40, and 70 ppm due to the electronegativity of the oxygen present in the compound. The NMR of the organic product is inconsistent with the typical NMR of pinacolone or water. This could potentially be due to a mixture of the two compounds when the NMR was run and is due to the experimental error in the separation of the aqueous and organic layers by pipet. Pina col was converted to pinacolone in the experiment at a 15.60% yield. A low percent yield was expected due to the experimental distillation and experimental separation of the two layers. Some pinacolone could have been trapped in the aqueous layer due to experimental error at separating via a pipet. The IR showed peaks at 2967, 2906, 2871, 2359, 2337, 2173, and 1989. The representative peaks in an IR of pinacolene are present between 3000 and 1700. The NMR when manipulated with a multiple of three, showed the presence of 9 hydrogens at 1.2 ppm and 3 hydrogens at 2.1 ppm. The typical NMR for pinacolone shows peaks around 20, 40, and 70 ppm due to the electronegativity of the oxygen present in the compound. The NMR of the organic product is inconsistent with the typical NMR of pinacolone or water. This could potentially be due to a mixture of the two compounds when the NMR was run and is due to the experimental error in the separation of the aqueous and organic layers by pipet.Pinacol was converted to pinacolone in the experiment at a 15.60% yield. A low percent yield was expected due to the experimental distillation and experimental separation of the two layers. Some pinacolone could have been trapped in the aqueous layer due to experimental error at separating via a pipet. The IR showed peaks at 2967, 2906, 2871, 2359, 2337, 2173, and 1989. The representative peaks in an IR of pinacolene are present between 3000 and 1700. The NMR when manipulated with a multiple of three, showed the presence of 9 hydrogens at 1.2 ppm and 3 hydrogens at 2.1 ppm. The typical NMR for  pinacolone shows peaks around 20, 40, and 70 ppm due to the electronegativity of the oxygen present in the compound. The NMR of the organic product is inconsistent with the typical NMR of pinacolone or water. This could potentially be due to a mixture of the two compounds when the NMR was run and is due to the experimental error in the separation of the aqueous and organic layers by pipet.Pinacol was converted to pinacolone in the experiment at a 15.60% yield. A low percent yield was expected due to the experimental distillation and experimental separation of the two layers. Some pinacolone could have been trapped in the aqueous layer due to experimental error at separating via a pipet. The IR showed peaks at 2967, 2906, 2871, 2359, 2337, 2173, and 1989. The representative peaks in an IR of pinacolene are present between 3000 and 1700. The NMR when manipulated with a multiple of three, showed the presence of 9 hydrogens at 1.2 ppm and 3 hydrogens at 2.1 ppm. The typical NMR for pinacolone shows peaks around 20, 40, and 70 ppm due to the electronegativity of the oxygen present in the compound. The NMR of the organic product is inconsistent with the typical NMR of pinacolone or water. This could potentially be due to a mixture of the two compounds when the NMR was run and is due to the experimental error in the separation of the aqueous and organic layers by pipet.Pinacol was converted to pinacolone in the experiment at a 15.60% yield. A low percent yield was expected due to the experimental distillation and experimental separation of the two layers. Some pinacolone could have been trapped in the aqueous layer due to experimental error at separating via a pipet. The IR showed peaks at 2967, 2906, 2871, 2359, 2337, 2173, and 1989. The representative peaks in an IR of pinacolene are present between 3000 and 1700. The NMR when manipulated with a multiple of three, showed the presence of 9 hydrogens at 1.2 ppm and 3 hydrogens at 2.1 ppm. The typical NMR for pinacolone shows peaks around 20, 40, and 70 ppm due to the electronegativity of the oxygen present in the compound. The NMR of the organic product is inconsistent with the typical NMR of pinacolone or water. This could potentially be due to a mixture of the two compounds when the NMR was run and is due to the experimental error in the separation of the aqueous and organic layers by pipet.

How China-Based Vanceinfo Grows Big Faster

CASE: HR-34 DATE: 01/23/09 SCALING: HOW CHINA-BASED VANCEINFO GROWS BIG FAST Our biggest challenge is that the company is growing very fast and we’re not sure that our systems can withstand such growth. 1 ? Chris Chen, Chairman and CEO, VanceInfo Technologies When Chris Chen founded VanceInfo Technologies in Beijing in 1995, the company had 25 employees and one low-end IT services outsourcing project for a U. S. multinational.By August 2008, through a combination of organic growth and acquisitions, VanceInfo employed more than 4,800 people, had numerous Fortune 100 clients, and enjoyed revenues exceeding $80 million over the preceding 12 months. It had attracted big-name venture capital partners and listed shares in 2007 on the New York Stock Exchange. Although small compared to more sophisticated Indian rivals, VanceInfo was well placed to capture an expected explosion in demand for Chinabased offshore IT services. At the same time, rapid growth was straining the firm’ s management personnel, systems, and resources.Headcount was slated to quintuple to 20,000 in four to five years’ time to keep pace with aggressive revenue targets. Old ad-hoc ways of doing things no longer could accommodate current or future needs. To succeed, management had to implement new financial, operational, and internal management systems, especially in the critical area of human resources where VanceInfo faced some of its greatest challenges. These included introducing effective processes for rapidly expanding, training, managing, and retaining its workforce in a fast-growth economy characterized by job hopping and a dearth of management talent.Moreover, in its quest to grow its workforce to 20,000 within five years, move into higher-margin business lines requiring new expertise, and beat out domestic and international rivals, management had to strike a balance between quick gains via acquisitions and potentially slower growth through organic expansion. 1 Interview with Chris Chen, Chairman and CEO, VanceInfo Technologies, August 18, 2008. Subsequent quotations are from the author’s interviews unless otherwise noted.Pamela Yatsko prepared this case under the supervision of Professor Hayagreeva Rao as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. Copyright  © 2009 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, e-mail the Case Writing Office at: [email  protected] stanford. edu or write: Case Writing Office, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 518 Memorial Way, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015.No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means –– electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise –– without t he permission of the Stanford Graduate School of Business. Scaling: How China-Based VanceInfo Grows Big Fast HR-34 p. 2 THE OFFSHORE IT SERVICES OUTSOURCING INDUSTRY In the offshore IT services outsourcing industry, a company in one country exported IT-related work to a firm in a second country, normally to take advantage of lower labor costs.The industry’s growth took off in the late 1990s when global communications infrastructure became increasingly inexpensive and reliable. With a large pool of low-wage, English speaking, technologically savvy workers at their disposal, Indian companies were preferred suppliers. Valued at $17. 3 billion by 2006, the global offshore IT services industry was expected to grow at a CAGR of 17. 1 percent between 2006 and 2011 compared to a CAGR of 7. 4 percent for the $674 billion global IT services industry (Exhibit 1). 2 Five of the world’s top 15 IT services firms in 2006 hailed from India, thanks to their outsourcing prowess (Exhibit 2). China in 2004 ranked second to India in attractiveness as an offshore location, according to management consulting firm A. T Kearny. 4 Albeit from a low base of $1. 4 billion in 2006, China’s offshore IT services industry was expected to expand even faster than the global industry as a whole, some 38 percent annually between 2006-2011 as U. S. , European, and Japanese clients looked to diversify away from India and gain a foothold for their products in China (Exhibit 3). 5 China also offered 30 percent cost savings over India and more than 700,000 engineering graduates annually. Potential brakes on growth included economic downturn in client markets and concerns that offshore outsourcing was stealing domestic jobs. Compared to their Indian rivals, Chinese vendors primarily offered IT outsourcing services to the China-based operations of multinational firms under the category of R&D Services (RDS). Although technically challenging, these RDS activities typically required less English than higher-end IT outsourcing services, making them a good fit for Chinese engineers, who for historical reasons were weaker in English than their Indian counterparts.RDS included localization and globalization services, in which vendors translated clients’ software products into Chinese and adapted them for the Chinese market. RDS also included software testing and development for clients’ products. In 2007, some 60 percent of international clients hailed from Japan and South Korea, while U. S. firms accounted for 20 percent. 7 Whereas clients generally paid vendors of higher-end, competency-driven IT services on a project basis, R&D services were usually billed on a less risky time and material basis (known as a resource or time model), under which vendors billed clients for their engineers’ time.The more people the service provider put to work for a client, the more revenue it made. Some Chinese vendors had started moving up the value chain to w ork on clients’ internal IT systems, offering Application Development & Maintenance (ADM), Application Testing and Quality Assurance, and Enterprise Solutions. Chinese vendors offering Enterprise Solutions 2 â€Å"Introduction to VanceInfo Technologies,† VanceInfo Technologies, Q2 2008, p. 21. Ibid. , p. 23. 4 Ibid. , p. 26. 5 Ibid. , p. 21 6 Ibid. , p. 25. 7 â€Å"CBR Project Watch-Chinese Outsourcing on the Rise,† Computer Business Review, April 2, 2007, http://www. bronline. com/article_cbr_asp? guid+ED23811B-B0B2-a65B-BD99-78AD9C0A889E, (October 10, 2008). 3 Scaling: How China-Based VanceInfo Grows Big Fast HR-34 p. 3 might customize and implement a U. S. software firm’s enterprise resource planning (ERP) software at a U. S. manufacturer’s China operations. These higher-end, more knowledge-based IT services (ITS) required expertise in the client’s industry. Despite the doubling of Chinese engineering graduates each year, Chinese vendors had trouble hiring enough qualified resources.Some firms were also setting their sights on scaling the top of the ITS value ladder to offer solutions to clients based on intellectual property created by their own engineers. Indian competitors had joined western counterparts in this more lucrative business. Success in the industry depended largely on management’s ability to attract, hire, train, and retain enough skilled workers to meet growing demand, rapid technological change, evolving industry standards, and changing customer preferences.And with labor costs accounting for roughly two-thirds of Chinese vendors’ total costs, finding ways to keep labor costs down was another key to competitiveness. Vendors made the most money by increasing efficiency and by predicting accurately market demand for specific skill sets and hiring/training for those skill sets. If they predicted incorrectly, they ended up paying for underutilized people. COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE VanceInfo co mpeted for business with a dozen Chinese players. Much larger Neusoft, which built its business serving the Chinese and Japanese markets, led the domestic pack by a wide margin with total offshore revenues of $145 illion in 2007 (Exhibit 4). 8 VanceInfo, which did $55 million in offshore revenues that year, ranked sixth in the industry domestically. Whereas many local rivals focused on China- and Japan-based clients, VanceInfo developed a niche as a â€Å"go-to† Chinese vendor for U. S. and European multinationals with a significant presence in the Asia/Pacific region. With $49. 5 million in North American/EU revenue, it was the top Chinabased outsourcing vendor in those markets in 2007. That said, ChinaSoft, with $45. million and HiSoft with $42 million, were not far behind (Exhibit 5). 9 Analysts expected the field to dwindle in the future as a need for scale encouraged companies to consolidate. 10 Besides domestic players, VanceInfo competed with large Indian outsourcing f irms, such as Wipro, Infosys, TCS, HCL, Satyam, and Cognizant. New vendors were also emerging in Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. Some international firms were establishing operations in China, driving up demand for IT service professionals and exacerbating employee turnover at Chinese providers.Although wage costs for skilled staff were lower in China than in India and western countries, these developments were putting pressure on wages in China. VANCEINFO MILESTONES Chris Chen, VanceInfo’s CEO, chairman, and founder, stood out from an early age. Born in 1963, he was the first person from his town in Jiangxi province to attend prestigious Tsinghua University in Beijing. He went on to work for state-owned Great Wall Computer, which in 1991 transferred him to Los Angeles. China’s economic reforms at the time were still in their infancy 8 â€Å"Introduction to VanceInfo Technologies,† op. it. , p. 19. Ibid. , p. 19. 10 â€Å"CBR Project Watch-Ch inese Outsourcing on the Rise,† loc. cit. 9 Scaling: How China-Based VanceInfo Grows Big Fast HR-34 p. 4 and the experience exposed Chen early to U. S. business practices. Two years later, Great Wall assigned him to help spearhead a major project in China for U. S. technology firm IBM. The Early Days of VanceInfo When IBM in 1995 approached Chen to start a software localization and testing company, he and two cofounders jumped on the opportunity. â€Å"IBM explained to me India’s success in IT service outsourcing,† he said.With IBM as the start up’s first customer, Chen secured a 300,000-yuan loan (US$1:RMB6. 8) from a friend. In 1997, VanceInfo, which originally went by the English name of Worksoft, started doing testing for Microsoft. It opened branches in Shanghai in 1999 and in Japan in 2001, taking on Fuji Xerox as a client. Growth in offshore IT services was steady, but slow. The firm grew to 80 employees in 1998 and 200 in 2001. Lack of access to fi nancing was a problem: China’s state banks did not want to lend to private firms; venture capital was scarce; and the government did not let private companies go public.With company profits its only funding source, VanceInfo, for instance, could not afford in 1997 to pay US$1 million to send 30 engineers to Singapore for training in order to win an important IBM project related to Y2K conversion for the European banking industry. The project instead went to India, Chen recalled. The firm also had trouble attracting talent, since Chinese engineers looked down on IT services outsourcing firms for not creating their own intellectual property. Moreover, the family members whom Chen relied on to help build his business, like most Chinese entrepreneurs those days, lacked professional management know-how.Realizing that VanceInfo’s family-run structure was hindering growth, Chen in 2001 instigated a management shake-up. He asked family members to leave and tried to attract pro fessional talent locally and overseas. He hooked up with David Chen (no relation), who had worked for a number of technology companies in Silicon Valley and was itching to do something entrepreneurial in China. Together, the two Chens hatched an idea to provide high-end IT consulting services for domestic clients along with outsourcing services for overseas clients.They succeeded in attracting financing from local investors, but the new business did not succeed as expected. â€Å"Profits from IT consulting services were terrible,† said David Chen, â€Å"We spent a lot of money and time preaching those ideas [ERP and BPO] to Chinese companies. I think at that time we were too ambitious and too stretched, and that was a hard lesson to learn. As a small start-up we should have stayed very focused. † They sold off the consulting division in 2004 to focus solely on offshore IT services outsourcing. Meanwhile, the business climate for offshore IT services outsourcing in Chin a by 2004 had improved.With China’s economy booming, Fortune 1000 firms started doing more outsourcing in China. VanceInfo gained a number of important international clients, such as PeopleSoft (later bought by Oracle) and Citibank, for whom VanceInfo established offshore development centers (ODCs) in China to do RDS and core banking system application testing respectively. 11 Under the ODC model, VanceInfo operated facilities and project teams dedicated solely to clients. It coveted these arrangements, in which both client and vendor invested in building the ODC, encouraging long-term client-vendor relationships.With clients continually creating new 11 In China, offshore development centers (ODCs), are sometimes referred to as CDCs (China Development Centers) due to political sensitivities over offshoring in client countries. Scaling: How China-Based VanceInfo Grows Big Fast HR-34 p. 5 software versions and ODC staff building up experience that clients did not want to lose, the work tended to be ongoing. Clients, who were extremely wary of intellectual property theft in China, favored the greater IP protection that ODC arrangements offered. Building Staff VanceInfo’s headcount by the end of 2004 jumped to 650 (Exhibit 6). 2 The industry had started gaining in prestige, making it somewhat easier to attract Chinese engineers. At the same time, VanceInfo was tidying house internally. Besides re-focusing management energy on offshore IT service outsourcing, Chris Chen believed the firm could not succeed without becoming international. To do this, he needed to hire more returnees with greater expertise in western business practices and more fluency in English than he himself possessed. Before hiring more returnees, however, he needed to resolve festering conflict over U.S. versus Chinese business practices between the several returnees already on board and the company’s local management team. He achieved this, he said, by clearly defining the responsibilities of all executives; making each responsible for their business units management, with a direct reporting line to the CEO; and by explaining the value that each side brought to the table. International teams would work on the front lines with international clients, while local teams would focus on dealing with local governments and controlling costs.To attract more returnees, Chen took advantage of new rules in China allowing VanceInfo to become an offshore Cayman Islands company, which in turn entitled it to offer stock options to employees. The re-domiciling also allowed VanceInfo to seek international venture capital. The firm in 2005 received funding from Silicon Valley VC Doll Capital Management (DCM) and local VC Legend Capital, with another Silicon Valley firm, Sequoia Capital, joining a second round in 2006. The VCs helped VanceInfo hone its governance structures, focus systematically on strategic and technical planning, and impose quarterly reviews. Between 2 001 and 2004, we knew about all that, but we only did it in increments,† President David Chen recalled. Rapid Growth With the groundwork thus set, growth took off. Between 2005 and 2007, VanceInfo acquired seven companies and set up or acquired seven new offices in China, three in the U. S. , and one in Japan and Hong Kong (Exhibits 7 and 8). It expanded into higher-end IT outsourcing services, and added a slew of international clients and two new ODCs (Exhibit 9). Net revenues in 2007 reached $62. 7 million and net income $9. 6 million, up from $29. 1 million and $4. 4 million in 2006 respectively (Exhibit 10). 3 Headcount surged to more than 3,600 by the end of that year (Exhibit 6). 14 Although most employees were Chinese nationals, VanceInfo’s workforce boasted 25 nationalities. The company’s leaders at the level of executive vice president and above were in some cases American citizens, but all of Chinese ethnicity. They were trying to attract nonethnic Chin ese managers, such as Technical Marketing Director Ken Schulz, a Caucasian 12 â€Å"Introduction to VanceInfo Technologies,† op. cit. , p. 6. VanceInfo Technologies, Form 20-F, June 27, 2008, p. 4. 14 Ibid. , p. 6. 13 Scaling: How China-Based VanceInfo Grows Big Fast HR-34 p. 6American, and the Shanghai director of VanceInfo’s Microsoft practice Hajime Hirose, a Japanese American. VanceInfo was particularly proud of its leading position among Chinese vendors in North America and Europe. But with technology and telecommunications clients in those regions accounting for the vast majority of VanceInfo’s revenues in 2007, management knew the company was vulnerable to an economic downturn in those geographies and sectors (Exhibits 11 and 12). Although VanceInfo boasted a large number of international clients, its top two clients, IBM and Microsoft, each accounted for over 10 percent of net revenues. 5 Becoming a Public Company The company in 2007 set its sights on be coming the first pure-play IT services outsourcing firm to list on the New York Stock Exchange. When the offering price for the December 2007 IPO fell far below the original petitioned price, senior management discussed whether or not to call it off. They ultimately decided to forge ahead, deeming more important the company’s goal of raising brand awareness in its most important market. The decision, said David Chen, seemed the right one given that the company â€Å"signed a lot of contracts† following the IPO, which still raised $75 million.Rather than bristle under public scrutiny, management welcomed the discipline it forced. â€Å"We think it is a great way to help us become more process-oriented in terms of financial reporting,† he said. Prior to going public, the firm changed its name from WorkSoft to VanceInfo Technologies. While it did so mainly to avoid trademark conflict with another WorkSoft in Texas, the choice of VanceInfo reflected the company†™s focus on advancing customer and employee potential as well as its desire to shift away from a purely labor-intensive model toward a more innovation-driven future.Company executives in 2008 expected brisk growth to continue, with revenues up some 40 percent annually over the next five years and headcount hitting 20,000. To balance the rapid growth of VanceInfo’s present and future customer base with the internal changes that needed to take place to accommodate that growth, VanceInfo redistributed responsibilities among its leadership in early 2008. David Chen, who had been chief operating officer, became president. In this role, the fluent English speaker became VanceInfo’s public face to the international community and could focus more energy on the booming sales area.In addition to his CFO responsibilities, Sidney Huang was made COO to oversee the company-wide systematization of internal business processes across the firm’s business units (Exhibit 13). GRO WTH STRATEGY VanceInfo’s growth strategy historically and going forward has involved winning new clients and expanding service lines, both organically and through strategic acquisitions. 15 Ibid. , p. 6. Scaling: How China-Based VanceInfo Grows Big Fast HR-34 p. 7 Service Line Expansion Labor-intensive R&D Services contributed the majority of VanceInfo’s revenues, some 63 percent in 2007 (Exhibits 14 and 15). 16 The handful ofODCs that VanceInfo operated for clients did mostly RDS work. VanceInfo typically started out doing a small RDS project for clients, proving itself on that project, and then winning more technically and/or geographically complex projects from them. Although ITS outsourcing accounted for 37 percent of revenues in 2007, VanceInfo wanted it to make up 50 percent in the future (Exhibits 14 and 15). 17 While profit margins were comparable for RDS and ITS, ITS was a larger market and presented stronger long-term growth potential for the company. In 2008 , VanceInfo’s profit margin hovered around 15 percent? ealthy for China where companies were often willing to do business for less—but not good compared to American and Indian IT services companies, which enjoyed profit margins above 20 percent. â€Å"So our profit margins would be flat,† said Schulz, â€Å"We’d probably be able to maintain rapid growth rates, but just not as rapid as if we were able to move into the IT services space as well. † Plus, the potential client base for RDS was limited to customers who developed their own software products. In ITS, VanceInfo could potentially serve any firm with an IT system.Explaining the firm’s decision in 2007 to invest more in IT services, James Xi, VP, General Industries Solutions, at VanceInfo in Shanghai, said: â€Å"Most of the revenue of Indian companies like Wipro comes from the financial services and manufacturing industries. We had to have a similar business model. † VanceInfo e xpected strong demand for ITS in China as multinationals expanded their presence in China and the Asia-Pacific region and needed to develop their IT systems. Xi believed VanceInfo’s knowledge of the China market gave it a competitive advantage over its larger Indian rivals.VanceInfo hoped to parlay its experience in ITS outsourcing into even higher-end Process Driven Services like Business Process Outsourcing (BPO), in which clients outsourced â€Å"non-core† functions, such as accounting, payroll, and customer service activities (Exhibit 15). Multi-year contracts, sometimes worth hundreds of millions of dollars, made BPO both highly attractive and competitive: Infosys, Wipro, Capgemini, Accenture, and IBM were among the players in BPO that VanceInfo would have to face. 18 The firm eventually planned to follow Indian and western rivals in providing solutions for clients based on its own intellectual property.The first step for VanceInfo in climbing up the ITS value lad der was strengthening its industry knowledge in targeted sectors: telecommunications; banking, financial services, and insurance; manufacturing and retail & distribution; and technology. That meant finding enough skilled talent with domain knowledge in those industries. Because engineers needed to act as consultants as well as developers in ITS outsourcing, they had to understand their client’s business, whether it consisted of supply chains for manufacturing clients or capital markets for financial service firms.Knowledge of business processes in China was low owing to the country’s recent transition from a socialist to a market economy and the continued existence of many state-owned enterprises. As a result, VanceInfo had to tap overseas markets in addition to the domestic 16 â€Å"Introduction to VanceInfo Technologies,† op. cit. , p. 5. Ibid. , p. 5. 18 â€Å"BPO – What Is Business Process Outsourcing? † SOURCINGmag. com, http://www. sourcingma g. com/content/what_is_bpo. asp , September 26, 2008. 17 Scaling: How China-Based VanceInfo Grows Big Fast HR-34 p. 8 market for ITS talent.Xi, who was one of the executives leading VanceInfo’s charge into ITS outsourcing, for example, spent 15 years in the U. S. working for Lehman Brothers, Bank of New York, Deloitte Consulting, and Bearing Point before joining VanceInfo in 2006. Besides hiring talent, VanceInfo was acquiring domain expertise. In August 2008, for instance, the firm announced the purchase of a 33 percent stake in an ITS outsourcing firm serving multinational financial institutions. It had an option to buy the remaining shares, depending on the acquired company’s performance.COO/CFO Huang explained VanceInfo’s strategy for building teams in targeted sectors: â€Å"You hire the leaders first—people within the industry—and have those people recruit and train more. For most of our critical verticals, we already have a team, so if the project expands, the team can recruit and train more people. The beauty of our business when it comes to business growth is we rarely get big projects up front; we almost always start with small projects. † Once VanceInfo built up sufficient domain knowledge, it would be in a position to develop its own IT solutions and software products for those industries.As of 2008, innovation at VanceInfo was limited to customization of other companies’ software for individual clients. It did not have an internal R&D budget: Instead clients paid for R&D that its engineers performed on their behalf. Investing in R&D was still a challenge for VanceInfo since the engineering hours spent on developing its own intellectual property were not billable. VanceInfo was therefore proceeding cautiously, focusing on its advance into higher-end IT services and strengthening industry knowledge on the grounds that its engineers could not develop their own IP for an industry without that knowledge. At the same time, management would start thinking about how to create its own IP. â€Å"When we build the ITS business, we should keep in mind to put an emphasis on innovation and solutions building. We need to cooperate more with research organizations and try to get some more ideas. And we should also empower our employees to come up with more innovative stuff. We no longer need to be heavily dependent on just the time model,† said David Chen. The company had already hired some highly educated engineers with multinational experience for the ITS business and was encouraging them to keep an eye out for ways to make VanceInfo more innovative.The company eventually hoped to hire a corporate CTO. â€Å"A traditional service company does not have a CTO, but to become very innovative, you need a CTO to be responsible for long-range innovations, not short-term numbers,† he said. Besides winning more technically complex projects, VanceInfo planned to increase revenues by winn ing more global ITS outsourcing projects. As of 2008, it mainly acted as clients’ China or Asia/Pacific (APAC) vendor, but had won a large U. S. manufacturer’s confidence to become its global provider for two major e-business projects.Xi explained: â€Å"We started with one IT services project and then they said, ‘Great job, I will give you five more projects, 10 more projects’ until they made us their exclusive APAC vendor. Then [in July 2008] they invited our team to their headquarters to discuss global projects. We met with 40 to 50 managers including their CIO and Global VP. They said, ‘Great. China can do this, not just India. ’ † This success was particularly sweet given the competition VanceInfo faced in global ITS markets from Infosys, Wipro, and other Indian rivals, which were well-known brand names inScaling: How China-Based VanceInfo Grows Big Fast HR-34 p. 9 U. S. industry circles and had bases there. VanceInfo in comparison enjoyed little U. S. presence or brand name recognition. â€Å"We have sales offices in New York, Silicon Valley, and Seattle, but we don’t have any real engagement team in the U. S. ,† Xi said (Exhibit 8). And while VanceInfo’s Chinese engineers could generally read and write English, they typically could not speak it as well as Indian engineers. They subsequently had difficulty participating effectively in conference calls with clients in the U. S. who often had to explain project requirements over the phone with VanceInfo’s team in China. Xi’s preferred solution was to hire returnees fluent in English and American culture to take senior management positions which required them to handle contacts with U. S. clients. Organic Growth vs. Acquisition By 2008, most of VanceInfo’s growth had been organic, with some selective strategic acquisitions (Exhibit 16). Although it made four acquisitions in 2007, Huang insisted the buying spree did not indicate a change in strategy, pointing out that only one-third of revenue growth came from M&A that year.He explained: â€Å"This is a fragmented industry so M&A should be part of our growth strategy. If there’s a perfect target we’ll jump on it. It’s just that there’s a tendency for CEOs to grow their companies through M&A because it’s easier than organic growth. They tend to ignore the danger in M&A. † M&A was ostensibly easier, he said, because VanceInfo gained a proven team with a manager rather than having to build a team one employee at a time. It also obtained the acquired company’s knowledge and customers, accelerating expansion into desired business lines, lumping revenues, and quickly gaining scale. VanceInfo could also leverage its larger platform to make the acquired company grow faster than it could on its own. The danger of M&A in IT services outsourcing? where a company’s assets were its people? was the possibil ity of acquiring a team that did not integrate well, resulting in the departure of the acquired firm’s core management team and customers. VanceInfo also had to make sure it did deals at a reasonable valuation. In its experience, entrepreneurs often had unrealistic price expectations, making it difficult to close the deal.Huang commented: â€Å"So it’s not that we don’t like M&A, we just fully recognize the challenges. This is such a great industry that even without M&A we could grow. We’ve proved it to the market in the past three quarters. Growth was purely organic. So why should we ruin this great growth story with some imprudent M&A activity? † Whether VanceInfo grew through acquisition or organically, Huang emphasized the importance of finding the â€Å"right people. † Executives stressed â€Å"cultural fit† between the candidate’s top management and VanceInfo’s.They determined cultural fit a number of ways, first s tarting with CEO-to-CEO discussions. When CEO Chris Chen met with the CEO of Beijing-based ITC, for instance, they enjoyed a meeting of the minds. â€Å"I think they have a lot of similar characteristics: very aggressive, very good salesmen, very inspiring, very charming,† said VanceInfo’s Regional Human Resources Director Wendy Xia, who originally worked for the smaller company and deemed its 2007 acquisition and integration into VanceInfo very successful.VanceInfo then structured deals to detect signs that the cultural fit was not as good as it seemed. Huang, for instance, informed acquisition targets that VanceInfo would divide payment into three tranches, paying the first tranche at the time of the purchase and tying the remaining payments to post-merger performance. This focus on contract details was different from Scaling: How China-Based VanceInfo Grows Big Fast HR-34 p. 10 traditional practices in China, where parties often signed contracts and hashed out the s pecifics later.According to Huang, the method allowed VanceInfo to find out how the candidate really perceived their future business prospects and whether the CEO and top management planned to stick around. â€Å"Sometimes everything seemed good. CEO-to-CEO, they were very happy. But when I lay out terms, the CEO backs off. That sends us a signal that they may just want to get out,† he explained. The less than stellar performance of a small acquisition made in 2005 in a â€Å"handshake type of deal† helped underscore for VanceInfo the importance of cultural fit, CEO commitment, and rigorous vetting.The CEO of the acquired company believed his team’s performance as part of VanceInfo warranted a greater reward than management believed he deserved. He eventually quit. â€Å"He did not integrate into our culture,† Huang said. And although his team stayed, it never performed as well as VanceInfo had hoped. Huang estimated that for every completed acquisition, a chastened VanceInfo vetted 10 companies. To be successful, the acquisition also had to be a win-win situation for both sides. For example, although ITC had some Chinese clients, its biggest customer was a major European telecom company, which accounted for 70 percent of its revenue.The European company wanted to use fewer outsourcing vendors and had voiced concerns to ITC about the firm’s ability to handle growing demand given its small size and lack of access to financing. After VanceInfo’s purchase of ITC, the European company was reassured: It became just one of five top VanceInfo clients and VanceInfo became one of the European company’s key mobile telecom vendors under development. Moreover, the ITC team started winning business from other multinationals in the same industry—business that it never would have won on its own.Former ITC employees were enthusiastic about the purchase. â€Å"I think this is a very good opportunity for me and ITC,† said William Wei, who two months after the acquisition was promoted from running sales and marketing for VanceInfo’s ITC sub-business unit to doing the same for the entire RDS division. VanceInfo’s efforts to integrate its acquisitions through cross-staffing new managers like Wei helped ensure that the initial enthusiasm for the acquisition did not wane and that VanceInfo got the most out of its new mployees. ITC founder Howard Yu, for instance, went from running a 251-person team at ITC in 2007 to heading up VanceInfo’s RDS Mobile business unit, under which the ITC sub-business unit grew to 450 people by mid-2008, and the RDS mobile unit as a whole grew to some 800 employees. Returnee Junbo Liu managed 45 employees for SureKam when VanceInfo bought the international business unit of the IT outsourcing firm in 2005. By 2008, he managed more than 2,000 staff as the head of VanceInfo’s RDS business unit.According to Huang, cross-staffing provided promisin g managers room to develop within a large organization and helped them understand VanceInfo’s culture and management approach. It also broke up the acquired firm’s tight group, mitigating turf-protection and other problems. Chris Chen also made sure to talk on a regular basis after the acquisition to the former CEOs, to understand their thinking and how VanceInfo could support them. VanceInfo was working as well on integrating acquired companies’ financial, accounting, human resource, and other systems with its own.For instance, VanceInfo tracked acquired companies’ monthly financial activity, sending them financial reports and talking to them about their performance. Scaling: How China-Based VanceInfo Grows Big Fast HR-34 p. 11 MANAGING GROWTH Company executives across the board underscored the importance of skillful management of human resources to VanceInfo’s past and future success. â€Å"We’re a service firm, but if you were to compare us to a manufacturer, our products and parts are our engineers and their skills,† explained Schulz.When trying to figure out how best to manage its growing staff of engineers, VanceInfo’s leaders did not have any real role models in China. The most successful Chinese technology companies were focused on manufacturing and sales & marketing—not services. VanceInfo instead looked to IBM, which organized human resource management into three centers: HR function, HR services, and HR solutions. China’s labor market posed a number of challenges owing to the country’s socialist past, doubledigit growth rates from 2002 to 2007, and potential as the world’s greatest market with more than 1. 4 billion consumers.China’s potential and its growth story inspired foreigners to pour $1. 8 trillion cumulatively in direct foreign investment into China by mid-2008, making it arguably the most competitive place to do business in the world. These factors c reated an â€Å"opportunity extravaganza† for engineering and managerial talent in China. The phenomenon affected attrition, retention, recruitment, and training at VanceInfo and complicated its goal of increasing its workforce to 20,000 in five years. VanceInfo Human Resource Director Kevin Liu commented: â€Å"The employees we recruit are not worried about having to find a job.Skilled labor has high expectations. If we do not provide them attractive conditions, it’s hard for us to retain them. † Xi compared expectations in China to those he encountered in the U. S. , where he recalled working with a 64-year-old database administrator: â€Å"His whole career was engineering. In China you can’t imagine this. When engineers here reach age 30, they want to become a manager or a salesperson. † Recruiting Because headcount determined business volume in the labor-intensive IT outsourcing industry, recruiting at VanceInfo was an extremely important funct ion.Despite China churning out some 5 million university graduates in 2007, of which 700,000 had engineering degrees and 3,000 had PhDs in computer science, â€Å"We see a continued challenge recruiting the best, most suitable employees for openings to keep up with the current pace of growth,† Huang said. 19 Indeed, one VanceInfo business unit offering higher-end IT services outsourcing reported having to put three projects on hold for a key client because it did not have enough qualified staff. Another unit doing RDS work for a major U. S. irm needed to fill 43 job openings and expected any day to have another 50 to fill. Campus Recruiting Campus recruiting accounted for approximately 25 percent of net hiring at VanceInfo, although percentages varied by business unit. VanceInfo’s Shanghai branch, which did higher-end IT services outsourcing, only recruited 10-15 percent of its employees from university because it required more experienced labor. Corporate HR handled c ampus recruiting for the business units. 19 â€Å"Introduction to VanceInfo Technologies,† op. cit. , p. 25.Scaling: How China-Based VanceInfo Grows Big Fast HR-34 p. 12 Its team in Shanghai, for instance, visited 30 to 60 universities in Eastern China from February to May each year. In some cases, its recruiters first met with project managers in specific business units to find out the skill sets required. If they found suitable candidates at the universities, they asked the candidates to take a test. If the candidates passed, the recruiters referred them to business units to work as interns prior to graduation, after which they ideally became VanceInfo employees.In other cases, recruiters used general criteria to scout for university students to attend special training courses, known as â€Å"VanceInfo University,† during their senior year or immediately after graduation. They sought candidates who were quick learners and not afraid to take on challenges. Candidates who successfully completed VanceInfo University were referred to specific business units. Shanghai branch head Gerry Lu estimated that 60 percent of the branch’s college hires came from the intern program and the remainder from VanceInfo University.The branch probably recruited 100 college graduates through the two programs in 2008, up from 70 to 80 in 2007, and hoped to recruit even more in the future. (See Training for more on VanceInfo University and the intern program. ) In response to complaints from business unit heads, the firm was trying to determine best practices for campus recruiting to improve its integration with business requirements, David Chen said. Recruiting Lateral Hires The majority of new junior engineering staff at VanceInfo were lateral hires, enerally people who had worked in another firm’s IT department for two to three years, ideally not a competitor’s to avoid poaching wars. In response to the job-hopping plaguing the industry and the company’s rising headcount needs, VanceInfo employed a low-efficiency recruitment strategy: Instead of employing 5 recruiters to recruit 30 engineers per month, for instance, it might employ 8 recruiters to hire 40 engineers a month. â€Å"This is more expensive, but it’s more suitable for us,† Liu said.VanceInfo recruited more than 800 entry-level workers in 2007, many via the Internet. Recruiters at the corporate and business unit level mostly tapped Chinese corporate recruiting websites to post job listings and scour resumes, in order to find junior staff with at least a year’s work experience. Take VanceInfo’s localization sub-business unit. It dedicated one recruiter to search sites for suitable resumes according to a set of criteria provided by project managers. The recruiter then called candidates to ask them to come in for a job interview.Some business units compensated employees for referring candidates. Lateral hires, though more experien ced than college graduates, were also more expensive: The starting salary for entry-level staff straight from college was 3,000 yuan per month and at least 4,000 yuan per month for workers with a year’s experience. Junior wages were rising some 6 percent annually. VanceInfo hoped to cut costs by hiring fewer junior people laterally and more from university. Recruiting Mid-Level ManagersAlthough young engineers often wanted to become managers, finding mid-level managers who understood how to manage engineers in a service business in China was a challenge, owing to China’s long manufacturing tradition, said David Chen. VanceInfo’s acquisitions accounted for nearly half of mid-level hires in 2006 and 2007, but company executives expected this Scaling: How China-Based VanceInfo Grows Big Fast HR-34 p. 13 proportion to decline given the company’s selective acquisition strategy. Other key avenues for recruiting managers were through websites and by grooming int ernally.VanceInfo’s corporate HR department did not yet have a centralized program for grooming managers from its engineering ranks, but rather left promotion and training tasks to individual business units. According to Chen, a key challenge going forward was for VanceInfo to figure out how to identify potential leadership candidates from middle management and turn them into top-line leaders (see Retaining Middle Management under Attrition and Retention for more on management grooming). This was particularly important given the shortage of senior managerial talent in China. It is hard to recruit suitable senior people in China. If you lose them, it’s difficult to back up the position,† Liu commented. VanceInfo senior executives with overseas experience often looked for recruits among other returnees—ones they met while overseas themselves or those referred by the firm’s VC partners. They looked for candidates, either in China or abroad, who felt th ey had reached a ceiling at their multinational corporation (MNC) employer and were interested in doing something more entrepreneurial.Hajime Hirose had considered starting an IT services outsourcing company after working for Microsoft in the U. S. for eight years, when the head of VanceInfo’s Microsoft practice, Jeff Wu, offered him the chance to run the Shanghai region’s practice. Hirose, who joined VanceInfo in January 2008, commented: â€Å"Microsoft is a great company, but it’s already established. This company is growing. They don’t have many processes, which is bad, but it excites me because that means we have a lot of room to improve.I figured that with my Microsoft and international experience I could make a difference here. † General Industries Solutions VP Xi estimated that for every 50 resumes he received, only two returnees were a match, of whom only one accepted. Not only did candidates need to have the right skills, want to return to China, and wish to join the ITS outsourcing industry, but their families had to want to move to China as well, which was tricky if their children were in school in North America and did not speak Chinese. Moreover, they had to have realistic compensation expectations.Xi recalled how one candidate seemed perfect until he demanded a salary similar to what he earned in North America: US$150,000 a year. When Xi could not meet it, the candidate requested an unrealistic number of stock options in the then pre-IPO company. â€Å"Everything has to be perfect,† Xi lamented. As a result, returnees accounted for only 5 percent of his staff. Given how critical a strong team of senior managers was to VanceInfo’s success, a question facing the company was whether to offer more competitive pay packages to lure high-level managers from multinational corporations.If so, it would need to reduce costs elsewhere. Its present cost control strategy emphasized opportunity over salary when r ecruiting/retaining all levels of workers. One sub-business unit head doing RDS business proposed that VanceInfo deflect the costs of offering MNC-comparable wages to senior employees by putting one senior manager in charge of many new graduates, thereby reducing the need for as many mid-level managers. In mid-2008, less than 10 percent of staff were senior, 30 percent middle, and 60 percent junior. â€Å"If we had more senior people, we could grow a lot faster,† he commented.Hiring Outside vs. Growth from Within The company’s leadership was also mulling over the best ratio of external professionals to homegrown talent for VanceInfo management. Despite the firm’s efforts to attract external Scaling: How China-Based VanceInfo Grows Big Fast HR-34 p. 14 professionals, most managers to date either came up through the ranks or its acquisitions. Those who came through acquisitions were normally entrepreneurs themselves, able to fit easily into VanceInfo’s coll egial culture. â€Å"Our competitors hire professionals.Within our company, except for the finance organization, we don’t have a lot of professionals in the business operations,† David Chen explained. But VanceInfo’s goal was to become a world-class company, he said, and it could not achieve that without hiring more professionals. Homegrown talent often did not have the breadth of experience and skill sets necessary to manage global activities at a world-class level, like VanceInfo’s global sales organization. On the other hand, professionals from multinational corporations sometimes had trouble working effectively in a fast-growing start-up. For one, they ere used to a large support infrastructure to help them perform their jobs, which did not and could not exist at VanceInfo. This meant they had to do more on their own and that the solutions to certain problems at their former employer might not be suitable for VanceInfo. â€Å"If we copied everything their multinational had today, we’d lose money,† Chen said. External professionals often came with unrealistic expectations as well as large egos that clashed with VanceInfo’s collegial culture. Plus, hiring them in large numbers would be discouraging to homegrown staff, leading to greater attrition. We want to be a world-class company. At the same time, we’re very entrepreneurial. How then do we strike the right balance between a professionally run organization and our passion and entrepreneurial spirit? † Chen asked. He believed the ideal scenario was to groom 70-80 percent of senior managers internally and to hire the rest externally to keep management’s thinking fresh. To reach this ratio, VanceInfo would need to beef up its programs for developing homegrown talent (see Retaining Middle Management under Attrition and Retention for more on management grooming). Current vs. Future Skill NeedsManagement also had to strike the right balance be tween current business needs and its goal of expanding into increasingly complex business lines that required employees with more advanced skills than those currently in place. To do so, VanceInfo wanted to become less dependent on the time model that typified the RDS business in favor of the competency-driven model practiced by more sophisticated Indian and western IT service companies. â€Å"I think we need to look at the marketplace two years from today, determine the skill set required and then build those competencies,† Chen explained.That said, the company at present did not plan to make big investments in building these advanced skill sets without clear indication of business demand. Instead, it planned to â€Å"invest gradually with an eye always on demand,† said Huang. Central vs. Branch Office Recruiting Management was also trying to determine how much to centralize its recruiting efforts. The Shanghai branch’s experience underscored the complexities o f finding the right balance at a quickly growing operation. Recruiting at the ranch before 2006 was left to individual business units, since each had different HR requirements owing to their clients’ different technical needs. The branch had maybe 100 employees and two to three business units, with unit managers handling recruiting. The downside of decentralization was that VanceInfo had no systematic way to track recruiter performance or offer recruiters a career path toward becoming a well-rounded HR professional. Scaling: How China-Based VanceInfo Grows Big Fast HR-34 p. 15 In 2006, the branch, which had grown to almost 500 employees, centralized recruiting.Centralization worked at that relatively small size, said Shanghai Branch head Gerry Lu: The account manager in each business unit could easily communicate the unit’s human resource needs to four or five recruiters based in Shanghai’s corporate HR department, who in turn could respond effectively to overni ght changes in clients’ requirements. By 2007, however, the branch had mushroomed to over 1,000 employees spread across five business units with multiple account managers handling an ever-growing number of projects.The centralized recruitment team could not always react quickly enough to satisfy clients, who expected seamless communication and understanding. Lu reorganized recruiting again, decentralizing it somewhat. Rather then clump all recruiters together in the corporate HR department, he put two to three recruiters back in each business unit to liaise between account managers and the centralized recruiting team. The four to five member centralized team hired the unit-level recruiters (with unit head approval), performed their performance evaluations, and provided them a career track.According to David Chen, management had not yet settled on the proper level of centralization for the company as a whole. Attrition and Retention VanceInfo’s attrition rate hovered ar ound 25 percent annually, which was average for the industry. Attrition varied, however, according to employee level. For project managers and above, who made up roughly 15 percent of the workforce and received stock-based compensation, the attrition rate rested in the single digits, Huang said. For the remainder, junior employees generally experienced the highest attrition rates, but numbers varied by business line.Attrition rates were below average in VanceInfo’s ODCs, mainly because employees felt they had a career ladder to climb. Attrition rates were higher in sub-business units focused on testing and lower-level activities, where little technical level differentiation existed. Many junior employees subsequently chose to leave after three years. Some went to work for VanceInfo’s multinational clients, which normally offered higher salaries, more prestige, and more professional training programs. â€Å"People leaving the company in some cases thought our training program was not comprehensive enough,† said Liu.Attrition rates were not formal criteria by which managers were evaluated, but according to company executives, managers knew they were very important. Retaining Senior Management VanceInfo executives attributed the company’s success thus far to stable and collaborative top management. They credited this situation to Chris Chen’s open-mindedness and his willingness to give managers enough opportunity and leeway to lead their teams. â€Å"If you look at our competitors, if there are any issues at this stage it’s internal management issues, meaning that people can’t work together.And when you have a defection at management level, it’s very disruptive,† Huang said. This fact, and the scarcity of senior managers in China, made retaining senior managers critical. Attracting and retaining senior managers, who at VanceInfo were aged 35 to 45, was tricky because the company could not afford to pa y as much as multinational corporations in China— let alone as much as returnees earned in North America. Shanghai Branch head Lu estimated that Scaling: How China-Based VanceInfo Grows Big Fast HR-34 p. 16VanceInfo paid senior employees between 12,000 yuan and 30,000 yuan per month, making it competitive with local rivals. It then had to contend with 10-15 percent annual wage inflation to keep up. Tony Zhang, for instance, who joined VanceInfo in 2005, said he earned only oneeighth the amount he had made in the U. S. working in the e-commerce department of a major American insurance provider. Why then did someone like Zhang not jump to a higher-paying position at an MNC? One reason was that VanceInfo sweetened its compensation packages for the top 15 percent of its employees with stock options.It also often supported returnees with trip allowances to visit families in North America, with help renting an apartment in China, and through assistance with visa issues and other pe rsonal matters. Most important, according to executives, was that VanceInfo used its high-growth status to provide senior staff with plenty of opportunities to continue developing their careers— opportunities that would be harder to come by at an MNC. These included giving senior managers autonomy to run their own business units and making them responsible for their unit’s profit and loss, which was uncommon in China. This company offers an open platform. So even though a returnee like me has no affiliation with its founders, I am able to utilize this platform to run my own show,† commented Executive VP Jeff Wu, who headed up VanceInfo’s Enterprise Solutions Practice and its Microsoft practice, overseeing some 900 employees, approximately 850 more than when he started working for VanceInfo in 2004. He did not believe he would have had the same opportunity to grow had he taken a position with an MNC upon his return to China after almost 10 years in the Unit ed States. Retaining Middle ManagementVanceInfo also sought to retain middle managers, normally aged 27 to 35, with opportunities for career development rather than increases in wages, which were comparable to local competitors’ and ranged from 7,000 yuan to 15,000 yuan, growing at an annual rate of 10 percent. The firm’s rapid growth allowed management to offer mid-level employees ever-greater responsibilities. The team they managed might grow as the client needed more work, or VanceInfo might win a new project or new client, in which case a superior could promote a manager to take on more responsibility there.VanceInfo’s corporate HR department did not yet have a centralized program for grooming managers from engineering ranks, but rather left promotion and training tasks to individual business units, whose programs differed. Promotions and movement between business units was also organized among business units, rather than centrally through Corporate HR. Like wise, business units had different systems for evaluating and rewarding employees. Corporate HR simply offered general guidelines.The Microsoft business unit pioneered a differentiated title system, under which its employees received a VanceInfo title in addition to their client-supplied title. For example, employees could be a ‘software test engineer’ as far as Microsoft was concerned, yet also be classified as an ‘associate manager’ internally at VanceInfo. According to Wu, the system, which was devised internally, worked well to motivate and develop the unit’s employees. â€Å"We have throughout the years promoted so many engineers to important positions—development leads, technical leads— and many of them became associate managers and managers.By leveraging a good title system we’ve been able to provide a clear pathway to get them moving up,† he said. Corporate HR tried Scaling: How China-Based VanceInfo Grows Big Fast HR-34 p. 17 to implement a similar company-wide program in 2007, but the project stalled when the newly hired HR executive championing it left the company. The Microsoft business unit also introduced a â€Å"two-track† career path for engineers to overcome the problem of losing talented engineers to management—a common approach at high-tech companies. In China, people perceived a promotion into management as the sign of career advancement and the route to higher pay.They therefore did not want to remain engineers even if that was where their talent lay. The Microsoft business unit offered engineers a chance to stay on the technical path, receiving promotions, titles, and pay equal to those on the management path. â€Å"We just have to communicate to people that they do not need to be a manager to move up the ladder,† said Hirose. As part of this program, the Microsoft unit offered stock options to 15-20 percent of engineers, in addition to the company-wide prac tice of offering them to executives at the director level and above.For Wu, steps like these were necessary to empower employees and middle managers in particular to take initiative and come up with solutions rather than relying on business unit heads, who had an increasing amount on their plates as a result of VanceInfo’s rapid growth. In addition to overseeing hundreds of projects for MNC clients, business unit directors had to meet P&L numbers to satisfy Wall Street, win more business, and hire and retain the right staff. â€Å"We need to have infrastructure in place so that normal people can do a fabulous job,† Wu commented.Rather than groom from within, business units that did ITS work preferred to hire senior managers externally. But Xi realized that doing so exclusively was demoralizing for internal staff, who needed promotion opportunities to stay motivated. â€Å"That’s the challenge I’m facing right now,† he said. He recently hired a nati ve English speaker to train talented engineers, promising them a promotion if they improved their English in six months. Retaining Junior Employees Retaining junior employees was tricky in a fast-growth economy like China’s.According to Liu, young workers had high expectations for quick promotions and salary hikes. With multinationals again offering higher salaries than VanceInfo could afford, the company emphasized opportunity and training over wages. Junior employees seemed satisfied with their VanceInfo salaries compared to those of peers in the same industry, but they stressed the importance of opportunity as part of their job satisfaction and their belief that VanceInfo, as a fast-growing company in a fast-growing industry, offered them that opportunity. If it did not, said one, â€Å"I will look for another job. VanceInfo found that retention was generally better among junior employees who attended VanceInfo University and/or worked as interns at VanceInfo before being hired full-time. That said, VanceInfo expected worse retention rates for junior staff, as employees unsuited for promotion or in low-end, non career-track jobs inevitably decided to pursue opportunities elsewhere. â€Å"If they leave after three, four, or five years, it’s okay,† said Lu. General Industries Solutions head Xi estimated that his business unit focused on providing a clear career path for its top 20 percent of employees only.Scaling: How China-Based VanceInfo Grows Big Fast HR-34 p. 18 Training VanceInfo’s focus on keeping labor costs down, and its perpetual need for bodies to fill large numbers of entry-level jobs, made hiring a greater proportion of VanceInfo engineers straight from university an important goal, particularly if the firm wanted to expand its workforce to 20,000 in five years. However, fresh engineering graduates in China were not well prepared to jump into VanceInfo projects; their university training was very theoretical.Recent gr aduate He Xiangao explained: â€Å"We always learned a lot of theory, but lacked practical experience. † Both to overcome those deficiencies and as a recruiting tool, VanceInfo’s corporate HR department designed a co-op program with 14 universities in China. These were not the country’s most prestigious colleges, but rather quality tier-two schools that graduated smart students willing to consider employment at a relatively unknown Chinese company rather than at multinational firms paying better wages. VanceInfo University VanceInfo’s co-op program had two components.The first was called â€Å"VanceInfo University,† in which students selected by VanceInfo recruiters attended the firm’s training classes for one to three months. At present, VanceInfo University was a more virtual concept than a physical one, with courses taking place at VanceInfo offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Dalian, Xi’an and a new dedicated training center in T ianjin. VanceInfo’s Beijing headquarters used to have a separate area for the classes, but the company needed that space to accommodate business growth and so courses there, as of August 2008, took place in conference rooms.While at VanceInfo University, students attended classes in common software development languages like C++, basic software testing, and other technical areas, plus English. VanceInfo then tested the students and recommended them to different business units, providing the units information on the training they received and their English language level. Business units then sent project managers to interview the candidates. The project manager might choose, say, three out of eight candidates. Those who weren’t selected received more training.

Study Plan for Masters in Surgery

ZSTU International Students Application Form | |? |(please print) | | |Name |Family Name | |Photo | | |? |(please print) | | | |Given Name | | | | | | | | |Nationality | |Gender | | | | | | | | |Passport No. | |Valid until | | | |? ? ? | | | |Date of Birth |Year Month Day |Marital Status | | | | |Place of Birth | | | | | | | |Religious Belief | |Physical Status | | | | | | |Highest Academic | |Major | | |Degree Obtained | | | | | | | |Current Employer or College Affiliated | | | Occupation | | | | | |Permanent Address | | | | Tel. /Mobile | Fax No. | E-mail | |My Contact Information | | | | | | | | | | Name | Tel. /Mobile | E-mail | |Contact on Emergencies | | | | | | | | | | Education & Work Experience | | | | | | | | | | | /Time for Chinese Learning: hours | |Proficiency of Chinese Language |HSK Band of HSK Achieved: | | | | |Preferences of College of Study | | | | | |Subject or Field of Study I Apply for | | | ? /From: ? /Year ? /Month ? /Day | |Duration |? /To: ? /Year ? /Month ? /Day | | /Categories of International Students I Apply to be in | |? /Bachelor’s Degree Candidate ? /Chinese Language Student | |? /Master’s Degree Candidate ? /General Scholar | |? /Doctor’s Degree Candidate ? /Senior Scholar | | |? /Scholarship ? /Self-supporting ? /Other | |Financial Support | | | | |Name, Tel & Address of the Guarantor Charging Your Case in China: | | | | | | /Guarantor’s Signature: Date: | | ( â€Å"? â₠¬ ? â€Å"? †) | |Do you have any of the following diseases(Each item must be answered â€Å"Yes† or â€Å"No†) | |? Yes ? No Cholera ? Yes ? No Venereal disease | |? Yes ? No Yellow fever ? Yes ? No Lung tuberculosis | |? Yes ? No Heart disease ? Yes ? No AIDS | |? Yes ? No Leprosy ? Yes ? No Mental illness | | /I hereby confirm that: | | , | |All information and materials given in this form are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I will take full | |responsibility for the authenticity of the above information. | | , ; | |I shall abide by the Chinese laws & the regulations during the study at Zhejiang Sci-Tech University and will not participate in any| |activities in China which are deemed to be adverse to the social order of China and are inappropriate to the capacity as a student. | | , |If I’m judged by the Chinese laws and decrees and the rules and regulations of ZSTU as having violated any of the above, I will not | |lodge any appeal against the decision of ZSTU on suspending my study at ZSTU or other penalties. | | /Applicant’s Signature: /Date: | | | |Advice of ZSTU Relevant Offices | | | | | | ): | |Director’s Signature(Seal) /Date: | | | |Remarks | | |

How did the Force Acts attack the Ku Klux Klan Essay

How did the Force Acts attack the Ku Klux Klan - Essay Example The Klan existed in three phases, but all of them focused on the same issues of racism. The success of the group was threatened and wiped by several Acts that were passed to protect the Black and minority in the society. The success of the Klan was due to political support and lack of proper legislation to protect the right of the blacks. With the problem of insecurity, in the slums, it was easier for the group to unleash terror to the Blacks who lived in the slums (Brands, Breen and Williams 390). Additionally, the three generations of the Klan were focused on making the lives of the immigrants worse through abuse and violence with the most affected being the black population. Most of the Klan based their argument on descent by claiming they were from the original British colonial revolutionaries. The Klan was politically linked to the Democratic Party with main support coming from the desire to restore white supremacy (Brands, Breen and Williams 392). The group with the support of political leader killed thousands of Negros. The covering of the face ensured that they evade prosecution, but fear of the southern democrat created a change in the political support. The group was eliminated by the passage of the force bills. These bills offered protection for the Black community and ensured the influence of the Klan was reduced. The force Acts are a series of four Acts passed by the US congress, to protect the rights of the Blacks. They are the 14th and 15th amendments of the American constitution. The act gave power to the federal authorities to penalize any interference in services offered to the African American. The violations produced over 5,000 indictments with the Supreme Court later ruling that some parts of the Acts were unconstitutional. The Acts offered protection to the black through enforcing support and legal redress in case of violations (Brands, Breen and Williams 400). The Act of April 20 1871

Their Eyes Were Watching God Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words - 5

Their Eyes Were Watching God - Essay Example The plot of this novel is set in a postwar era when it was difficult to accumulate wealth, but Logan still managed to offer physical security and shelter. This paper, therefore, analyses the difference between Nanny and Janie’s worldviews in relation to the theme of Love and Relationship versus independence as presented in chapter three scene. Janie perceives Nanny as a former slave who had no independence and, therefore, she would have such a perception. Her life has been characterized by hardship and poverty, and any progress to acquire material wealth has been derailed by her skin color. Therefore, according to her perception, Logan who owns his own land and has financial independency is the ideal husband she could dream of when she was still young. However, according Janie, a woman in her current age should pursue something more than material wealth from a man. She is looking for some kind of completion that offers both emotional connection and passion. Emotional and physical connections are significant in her life and inseparable from her understanding of love. This is the reason she describes Logan as â€Å"ugly† and â€Å"he doesn’t speak beautifully to her† (Hurston 27) when explain why she does not love Logan. This implies that she neither feels physical, nor intellectual, nor emotional conne ction to him. In the pursuit for physical and emotional connections to a man, she decides to run away with Jody. She believed that her real man was hiding somewhere. Janie believes â€Å"God tore down the old world every evening and build a new one by sun-up. It was wonderful to see it take the form with the sun and emerge from the gray dust of its making† (Hurston 32). This is a sign of Janie’s romantic desires. She is even ready to compromise or abandon these desires for the possibility of change. In conclusion, the conversation between Nanny and Janie, in Chapter

Annotated bibliography Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words - 4

Annotated Bibliography Example Special representation needed the presentation of specific goal domain, and complex styles of drawing existed at the commencement of the problems than at later times. Findings from this study are essential as they show how artists can traverse between 2 dimensional and 3 dimensional imagined works necessitating the representation of various spatial coordinates systems, strategic application of drawing styles to help in inferring 3 dimensions dynamic actions. The researchers demonstrate how artists with some form of disability can employ semiotic modalities and various activity goals to infer motion and space. These results are essential to research on tools and knowledge needed to infer motion and space from visual displays, and have implications for artists with disabilities. This paper presents the technological solutions obtainable for enhancing the accessibility of learning materials for individuals with incapacities. The research importantly highlights the design features that computer-based assessments have that can help disabled children. The researchers posit that today’s technologies like assistive devices have emerging strategies that make learning more flexible even for disabled students. Additionally, the research describes developments in the ambient intelligence field that may be essential in educational environments. The research findings are important as they elucidate how individuals with a disability in motor skills can benefit through technological advancements. The findings imply that technologies provide tools that can lead to increased learning capabilities for children without fine motor capabilities. Further, this research implies that children without fine motor capabilities can still venture into graphic design given that they receive sufficient training and essential technological tools. Singh and his colleague explore the percent of children with intellectual

Impact of Globalization on the country Identity Essay

Impact of Globalization on the country Identity - Essay Example Furthermore, numerous buildings in the city are still designed based on their historical relevance. The impact of globalization has been spread out across different countries all over the world. The world has become more interconnected than ever. Never before in the history has international connections between world trade, communication, and politics been seen at this rate and pace. The responsibilities of planners have also increased with the arrival of globalization and as research indicates, the planning of cities is no longer limited to physical planning, but it now also includes the social and economic fabric (The Role of Planners in the Globalization Era, 2004). The globalization of economic, social, environment and political matters have not been limited to the national level, but have now also affected the urban and architectural planning of the city. Globalization is a term used by a development and interaction process of international union arising from the networking of world views, products, ideas and other aspects of culture. Advances in transportation and telecommunications infrastructure are major factors in globalization, generating further interrelationships of economic and cultural activities (Globalization, 2014). In the globalized world, geography does not become less important, instead it has become more relevant. This is because of the fact that globalization enhances possibilities in increasing geographic differentiation and location which then reflect on overall planning. The globalization extends a large group and city regions outside their borders. The internal and external of these cities and their growth present a number of challenges for policy makers in their planning. Based on the history of urban planning in Qatar, changes in planning can be recognized. In 1935, British petroleum initiated oil exploration in Qatar. High quality oil

The Buffalo Soldiers in World War II Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

The Buffalo Soldiers in World War II - Essay Example As expected, they were discriminated during their service in the army. Many officers did not wanted to command them including George Armstrong Custer. Their role eventually dwindled due to discrimination as their participation in World War I was limited. The idea of the Buffalo soldiers in 1866 was carried on to the Second World War when the 92nd Infantry Division which were composed of African American soldiers under the command of Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond. They adapted the insignia of the Buffalo soldiers and were hence nicknamed the â€Å"Buffalo Soldiers Division†. This division fought in Europe in the Second World War particularly in Italy from 1944 until the war ended. Unlike in World War I where their role was diminished, the Buffalo soldier fought at the front line in the European Campaign with the tankers of the U.S. 1st Armored division and fought until the war ended. African American 92nd Infantry Division Fought in Italy During World War II. (n.d.). Retrieved February 25, 2015, from

Stakeholder analysis Wal-Mart in Mexico case Essay

Stakeholder analysis Wal-Mart in Mexico case - Essay Example The stakeholders listed in this study may not be a comprehensive list of Wal-Mart stakeholders as those not mentioned are not affected by the case in Mexico. The table below provides the stakeholders affected by the case together with their stakes, attributes, and responsibilities of Wal-Mart towards them with the strategies and actions (Carroll & Buchholtz, 2014). It is evident some other stakeholders of Wal-Mart including social activists, local government, businesses operating near Wal-Mart, communities where Wal-Mart stores are located, among others. The reason is that they are not affected by the Mexico case. The reasons for selecting and classification of the different stakeholders in the manner depicted in the table, and Wal-Mart’s specific avenues for dealing with the case are provided in detail in the proceeding sections of the paper. The first consideration entailed the ranking of the stakeholders beginning with those most affected by Mexico case through the consideration of the typology allowing for the determination of the most important stakeholder to be dealt with in the Mexico case. The stakeholder importance order includes the dealing with the definitive stakeholders, followed by the dominant stakeholders, and lastly the dominant stakeholder since three types of stakeholders were identified in the case. The definitive stakeholders consist of employees, shareholders, customers, and the US government owing to the direct impact of the case on these stakeholders and dealing with them first hand would allow for a clear and faster resolution of the case. Wal-Mart employees are involved in the daily running of Wal-Mart operations giving them the power and legitimacy and they hold an interest in the company being their employer and through the employment contract they have a right in the case. The poor conditions of work, poor payments and unpaid overtime, low benefits, not promoting female

Investigating Resistance Essay Example for Free

Investigating Resistance Essay Resistance is a property of a substance that conducts electricity. Resistance opposes the flow of electricity through conductors and it depends on the PHYSICAL NATURE of the particular conductor. In this investigation I must investigate how one of these physical facts affects the resistance. I will split my investigation into four parts, I will firstly plan my investigation. This will allow me to explain how I will carry out my investigation and predict what I think will happen. The second part of my investigation will be the obtaining part. To complete this I must carry out my investigation and record the results. I will then be able to say if my prediction was correct. The third part will be analyzing the results I have made. This will allow me to draw conclusions. The fourth and final part will be evaluating my investigation, I will say if it could have been improved and if it worked as expected. APPARATUS I will need a Digital ammeter and a digital voltmeter because the readings given are a lot closer than with an analog one. I will need just over a meter of 0. 19mm thick nichrome, a meter stick, a power supply, some wires and two crocodile clips PLANNING I have been given a piece of wire called Nichrome, which has a thickness of 0.19mm. I will connect this into the circuit using crocodile clips, I will stretch the wire across a meter stick and connect one crocodile clip at 0cm and one at 10 cm, I will record a reading from both the ammeter and the voltmeter, I will then move the crocodile clip which is on 10cm to 20 cm and again take a reading from both the ammeter and the voltmeter before recording the results into a table. The variable for my experiment will be the length so to keep it a fair test I must use 10 cm jumps each time, use the same metal each time meaning it must be Nichrome of 0. 19mm. I will eventually have a full table of results ranging from 10cm to 100cm. PREDICTION I predict that as the length of the wire increases, the resistance will increase. I predict this will happen because Resistance is due to the atoms in the wire. The electric charges will collide with the atoms, slowing them down. If the wire is longer, then there are more atoms in the way of the charges so the resistance will increase. The resistance will depend directly on the number of atoms in the wire. I have indicated in the rough graph below on what I think will happen and what it will then look like on the graph. RESULTS Results below are first set recorded Length Of Wire Current Voltage Resistance CMSecond set will now be recorded before finding the eventual average Results below are Second set recorded Length of wire Current Voltage Resistance CM (A) (V) (Ohms) The table below shows the average of the results allowing me to plot the graph. It shows the average resistances Temperature Resistance results 1 Resistance results 2 Average Resistance CM (Ohms) (Ohms) (Ohms) . I will now go on to plot the graph before recording my conclusion. Conclusion After recording my results and plotting the graph I can say that my prediction was correct. This shows that resistance is greater the longer the wire is because there will be more atoms for the electrical charges to hit the atoms and get slowed down. From what my results say I am willing to predict that if I had a thicker piece of Nichrome say 0. 37mm thick then the resistance would be even greater because not only will the length give more resistance but now that it is thicker will mean there will be space for more atoms.

The Battle Of Balaclava History Essay

The Battle Of Balaclava History Essay The Allied victory against the Russians at the Battle of Balaclava on 25 October 1854 was a succession of blunders. Besides the most famous of which is Never get involved in a land war in Asia, there were also major failures in intelligence and communications. Inadequate intelligence preparation resulted in inadequate planning and execution. Poor situational awareness by the Allied commanders on the battlefield contributed to disastrous misunderstandings in communication. The extraordinary bravery exhibited by The Thin Red Line of the Highlanders and the selfless charge of the Light Brigade Into the Valley of Death would not make up for these shortcomings. Failure to Prepare The Crimean War was fought between the Allies of France, Britain and Ottoman Turkey against Russia to remove Russian occupation from the Crimean Peninsula. The war lasted from October 1853 to February 1856. The Battle of Balaclava was the second major Crimean campaign. The purpose of the campaign was to occupy the Russian held port of Sebastopol on the western end of the peninsula. The British army was to march southeast, occupy Balaclava, and lay siege to Sebastopol. The occupation of Balaclava was necessary for resupply and protection of the Allied flank (Kennedy, 1976). The British had failed to consider the climate of the Crimean peninsula in their planning. There was a lack of tents and proper winter clothing which led to reduced combat effectiveness. The British did not have maps and conducted the march by compass alone. The British did not have intelligence of the Russian unit locations. During the march to Balaclava, the leading British elements stumbled across the rearguard elements of a Russian unit at Mackenzies farm. A Russian officer was captured and questioned, but no usable intelligence was gained because the officer was inebriated (Kennedy, 1976). The British lack of intelligence meant they did not know the size of the waiting Russian force they were approaching at Balaclava. The only resistance they met at Balaclava was from a small garrison. The day after the British arrived, French units also arrived. The plan had been for the British and French to both occupy Balaclava prior to the siege of Sebastopol. Their intelligence had failed to show that Balaclava was much too small to support such a force. The French Force was moved to Kameisch Bay leaving the British solely responsible for protecting the Allied flank. Intelligence analysis of the terrain north of Balaclava would have revealed this was not a good choice (Kennedy, 1976). The valley north of Balaclava was blocked to the west by the Sapaune Heights. On the east end of the valley were the Woronzlov Heights. The north side of the valley was bounded by the Fedioukine Heights on top of which ran a road into the interior. Down the middle of the valley, from east to west, ran a ridgeline known as the Causeway Heights (see appended Figures 1-3). The Causeway Heights concealed any actions on the north side of the valley from observers in the south side of the valley (Kennedy, 1976). This blockage of the line-of-sight would contribute to the later blunders. The British constructed four redoubt positions manned by Turks under the command of British Artillery Non-Commissioned Officers along the top of the Causeway Heights approximately a half-mile from each other and a fifth redoubt on top of Canroberts Hill. The cavalry units were encamped at the western end of the South Valley. Infantry (93rd Highlanders), more Turks, and a field battery were positioned around Kadikoi. Twelve-hundred Royal Marines defended Mount Hiblak with twenty-six guns. To the northwest, five British infantry divisions and the French Observation Corps were in the Chersonese Heights (Anthill, 2001). This left the British units extended and unable to support one another while attempting to cover all possible avenues of approach. The British still did not have intelligence on the size or distribution of the Russians (Kennedy, 1976). The British did know, as a result of their skirmish at Mackenzies Farm, that there was an element of Russians somewhere to the east. The British did not know the intentions of the Russians resulting in frequent alerts everytime a Russian scouting patrol was seen. These alerts led to decreased morale and a boy-who-cried-wolf mentality among the British troops. On 24 October a Turkish spy reported the Russians were going to attack on 25 October with 25,000 troops. As a result of the numerous false alerts, this warning was ignored. No attempts were made for reinforcement or to strengthen the British position (Kennedy, 1976). The Russian Attack The Russians, on the other hand, had been conducting intelligence operations and were aware of the weaknesses of the British position. The Russian Commander, Prince Menshikov, planned a three axis attack. In the south, Major General Gribbe, would capture the village of Kamara and move toward redoubt number one. Gribbe had a combined force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. In the center, second axis, Major General Semiakin would command two columns with artillery support to attack towards redoubts one and two after crossing the Tchernaya. In the north, Colonel Skuderi would cross the Tractir Bridge and move towards redoubt three. After these redoubts were taken, General Ryzhov was to attack the positions around Kadikoi with a unit under Major General Zhaboritski to protect their flank (Anthill, 2001). Before dawn on 25 October the Russians started their advance alerting the British troops under command of Lord Lucan. Lucan sent word to the British Commander-in-Chief, Lord Raglan, and moved Brigadier James Scarletts Heavy Brigade with the Earl of Cardigans Light Brigade in reserve to the western end of the Causeway Heights. The battle began at dawn when the Russian infantry attacked and took redoubts one to four with very little resistance from the Turkish defenders (See Figure 1, A). The Russian force then concentrated around redoubts one to three to prepare for a cavalry attack on Kadikoi. Raglan put the 3rd Infantry on alert, ordered the 1st Division into the South Valley, and the 4th Division into the North Valley. Unfortunately, these divisions would not make it to the battlefield before it was all but over. Sensing the threat to the British lines of communication, the French Commander-in-Chief, Canrobert, ordered two infantry brigades and eight cavalry squadrons to the wester n end of the South Valley (Anthill, 2001). The Thin Red Line At about 0830 Liprandi ordered Ryzhov to attack the enemy camp; the first of many vague orders during the battle. Ryzhov moved west along the North Valley. A small force cut off over the Woronzlov Heights towards Kadikoi. The 93rd Highland Foot was positioned behind a ridge in the road to take cover from the artillery turned against them. The commander of the 93rd, Sir Colin Campbell, arranged his men two deep (instead of the doctrinal four deep) standing abreast. On their flanks were Turks who fired one volley before retreating. Sir Colin Campbell rode up and down the line saying: There is no retreat from here men, you must die where you stand. The 93rd fired three volleys into the advancing cavalry. The Russians wheeled and retreated to rejoin Ryzhovs main body (See Figure 1, B). The Crimean War was the first war to see war cor-respondents on the battlefield. London Times correspondent W.H. Russell watched the scene and wrote of seeing the thin red streak tipped with steel. This ph rase would be shortened into the now common phrase The Thin Red Line (93rd Sutherland Highland Regiment of Foot Living History Unit, Inc.). Follow, and up the hill, up the hill, up the hill, Followd the Heavy Brigade. Tennyson, The Charge of the Heavy Brigade The Heavy Brigade was next to be involved against the Russians. The Thin Red Line had succeeded and Ryzhov had halted about one hundred yards uphill from the Heavy Brigade. Brigadier Scarlett, facing the main enemy cavalry force, wheeled his force and although outnumbered, charged uphill toward the Russian cavalry (See Figure 1, C). Even someone completely unfamiliar with military tactics can understand that consideration of the terrain could have placed the Heavy Brigade in a better location instead of positioning them to charge uphill. Despite this terrain dis-advantage, after some heavy fighting, the Russian cavalry broke and retreated back to the Woronzlov Heights (Anthill, 2001). Into the valley of Death rode the six hundred. Tennyson, The Charge of the Light Brigade The greatest blunder of the battle, and one that lives in infamy began at approximately 1015. Raglan ordered to advance and seize any opportunity to retake the Heights, but did not specify which heights. Rather than seek clarification, Lucan took this to mean the Woronzlov Heights and moved the Light Brigade into the North Valley and kept the Heavy Brigade in the South. Raglan saw the Russians were moving to haul away the captured guns from the redoubts. In what resembled a bad example of the childrens game of telephone Raglan gave an order to his Quartermaster, Brigadier Airey, who in turn wrote the order as Lord Raglan wishes the Cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, follow the enemy, and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troop Horse Artillery may accompany. French Cavalry is on your left. Immediate (The National Archives, United Kingdom) and gave it to his Aide de Camp, Captain Nolan, who in turn relayed the order to Lieutenant General Lucan. What message Nolan p assed to Lucan is unknown, though Lucan claimed that Nolan vaguely waved his arm across the North Valley and stated that they were to charge the guns. From his lack of situational awareness, Lucan only knew of the guns at the end of the North Valley where Ryzhov had moved. The next stage of the blunder came into play. Lord Cardigan, the commander of the Light Brigade, had recently divorced Lucans youngest; not creating the best command climate. Lucan ordered Cardigan to charge the guns. As Cardigan started the Light Brigade up the 2 kilometers of the North Valley, Nolan was waving his sword in the air, possible to try and redirect the charge toward the redoubts when he was killed (see Figure 3). The Light Brigade took artillery fire from one of the captured batteries on their right flank, three batteries on their left flank, and from the battery they were charging toward. They pushed through the line of guns and forced Ryzhovs cavalry to retreat back. The Russians believed the Briti sh must have been drunk. The French Marshal Bousqet stated It is magnificent, but it is not war: it is madness. Twenty minutes after the start of the charge, the survivors returned. Six-hundred thirty-seven started the charge. The brigade lost three-hundred sixty men and five-hundred seventeen horses (Anthill, 2001). The French Cavalry swept in and cleared the Fedioukine Heights (see Figure 2) to protect the Light Brigades flank during the retreat. The British infantry divisions moved into the valley and continued a halfhearted fight against the Russians for the rest of the afternoon. The Russians held the Woronzlov Heights and pulled away the captured guns. Aftermath and Conclusion Blame for the destruction of the Light Brigade began soon after the battle. Raglan blamed Cardigan who blamed Lucan who blamed Nolan. Since Nolan was killed in the battle, he couldnt defend himself. The matter would be debated for decades. The press coverage exalted the bravery of the Light Brigade instead of the failures of the command. Cardigan went home to Britain as a hero and was made Inspector General of the Cavalry. Lucan was made the scapegoat by the British command, but was still awarded with the Order of the Bath. This attitude of bravery over intelligence led operations would prevail in the British military until World War I. Both sides claimed the battle as a victory. The British succeeded in defending Balaclava. The Russians, although failing to break through the Allied lines of communication, had succeeded in taking strategic positions. The Battle of Balaclava and especially the charge of the Light Brigade remains a classic example of military failures in intelligence and communication. Todays Soldiers can identify with the importance of clarifying vague orders. The modern version of the operations order and fragmentary orders used by the United States Army greatly aid in this clarification. Clearly defining the Commanders intent is possibly the most stressed step for the planning cell when preparing an operations order. If the British military had used modern methods of intelligence preparation of the battlefield, they could have better planned for the defense. They could have defined the avenues of approach, established fields of fire, and been aware of how the terrain affected line of sight. If the commanders on the field had been kept aware of the overall battlefield situation, rather than just what was within view, the Light Brigade may have moved according to Raglans intent. The Battle of Balaclava, especially the charge of the Light Brigade, remains a classic example of military failures in intelligence and communication. File:Battle of Balaclava (map 1).png Figure 1. (Public domain) File:Battle of Balaclava (map 2).png Figure 2. (Public domain) File:Charge Timeline.jpg Figure 3. (Public domain)

Causes of Construction Delays

Causes of Construction Delays This chapter gives an idea of what construction delays are, how are they defined and what are their types and comparison of them. Delays can be seen differently from different point of views. Causes of delays and categorization of them in various international contexts are also discussed. 2.2 DEFINING CONSTRUCTION DELAY A lot of work has been done before on construction delays and every author came up with his/her own definition. Assaf and Hejji defined delay as Time overrun either beyond completion date specified in a contract, or beyond the date that the parties agreed upon for delivery of a project slipping over its planned schedule. (Assaf, Hejji, 2006) Stumpf defined delay as Act or event that extends the time required to perform a task under a contract. It usually shows up as additional days of work or as delayed start of an activity. (Stumpf, 2000). And many similar definitions were given. Therefore construction delays can be considered as time lag in completion of activities from a fixed time as per contract or they can be defined as late completion or late start of activities to the planned schedule or contract schedule. When project delay occurs it means project cannot be completed within stated time, which means there will be extensions of time required which will further result in fine, increased cost due to inflation, termination of contract, court cases etc. or combinations of above stated factors. Delay can be seen as risk for the project and could be handled at inception stage or at least one can try to mitigate or minimize it. Risk is an integral part of a construction project; it is well known that no project is risk free. If risk is analysed at inception or planning stage it could be managed, minimized, shared, mitigated or accepted to give some good results. Delay can be considered similar to risk or a type of risk; as no construction project is free from delays, delay is also integrated part of construction projects. It depends on size of project as well. Therefore it is expected to analyse and manage delay in same fashion as risk. Delays are often result of a mismanaged event which must have been managed in a systematic process so as to analyse the effect of that event on the project and how to minimize chances of further delay. (Keane, Caletka, 2008). 2.3 CATEGORIZATION AND TYPES OF CONSTRUCTION DELAYS Before getting on types of various construction delays there is a major categorisation which is required to be understood. Construction delays can be delayed in some major groups as listed below. El-Saadi (1998) categorized delay in four major groups. Critical or Non critical Excusable or Non Excusable Compensable or Non Compensable Concurrent or Non concurrent Alkaas S., Mazerolle M. and Harris F. (1996) and Ahmed S.M. et al gave following categorizations: Excusable Delays Excusable compensable delays Excusable noncompensable delays Nonexcusable delays Concurrent delays Fig. 2.1 Classification of delay based on their various attributes. Nuhu Braimah (2008) To achieve objectives of this dissertation and to consider delay as risk it is necessary to know about these types of delays and as per categorization in what category they lie. This basic knowledge helps in moving forward and determining strategies to mitigate these risks. Now in this part we will discuss these types of delay in detail: 2.3.1 CRITICAL AND NON CRITICAL In simple words Critical delays are those which cause delay to entire project completion date while Non critical delays not necessarily affect the project completion date but affects progress. In all the projects delays are considered at the project completion date. Delays can be combination of small and big delays that occurred during the whole project. Therefore critical delays are taken more into consideration then noncritical delays. 2.3.2 EXCUSABLE DELAYS Excusable Delays occurs due to events which are outside the control of contractor like heavy rains, storms, strikes, fire, client suggested changes, differing site conditions, change of government policy or their intervention, stakeholder intervention etc. Alkass S. et al (1996) says that when there are excusable delays, contractor is entitled to time extension in case date of completion is extended. Such delays can also affect non critical activities which must be considered with more detailed analysis or adjustment of float time. Excusable delays can be further classified in compensable and noncompensable delays. 2.3.2.1 EXCUSABLE COMPENSABLE DELAYS As name suggests excusable compensable delays are those in which contractor is entitled for extra payment (compensation) i.e. monetary compensation and time extension as well. But decision that a delay is compensable or noncompensable is taken as per contract between client and contractor. Natural disasters or some reasons which are out of control are not considered. Example of such delay could be that client doesnà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢t allow access to site even after notice to proceed is given; other such delays which are due to client are compensable. 2.3.2.2 EXCUSABLE NONCOMPENSABLE DELAYS Such delays are such where both contractor and client are not responsible for delay. Under such circumstances only time extensions are granted and no monetary compensation is provided. Such delays include act of God. 2.3.3 NON EXCUSABLE DELAYS As name suggests these delays are such that they donà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢t have any excuse or no excuse can be given for them. They arise due to carelessness or actions and inactions of contractors and subcontractors. For such delays no time extensions and monetary compensation is given to contractor if it has affected whole duration of project. In such cases client is liable to get liquidated damages. Example of such delay could be constructing something wrong which is not given in drawings, not completing work on time, improper resource allocation etc. 2.3.4 CONCURRENT DELAYS This is the most complex categorization of delay as it consists of two or more kind of delays regardless of their type which occurs at same time or overlaps some duration together. It is necessary to find out what type has caused overall delay in project completion. Therefore different factors like time of occurrence of delay, duration of delay, impact of them, float ownership etc. have to be considered carefully. Alkass et al (1996) said that; Concurrent delays which contains two or more excusable delays results in time extension. When compensable and nonexcusable delays are concurrent a time extension can be given or delay can be distributed between client and contractor. 2.4 CAUSES OF CONSTRUCTION DELAYS In section 2.3, categorisation of delays was discussed. Now in this section will deal with causes of delays. Lot of work has been done on understanding causes of delays. The two major categorization of delay causes one is Internal Cause another is External Cause. Internal cause includes delays caused by parties involved in construction project like Client, Contractor, Designer, Consultant these are four major parties then Subcontractors, material suppliers etc. comes. From external factors it includes act of God, strikes, stakeholderà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s dissatisfaction etc. Assaf and Hejji (2006) reflected various causes of delays which occur in large construction projects. They had a field survey of 23 contractors, 19 consultants, and 15 owners and found out and reflected on 73 causes of delays under eight different groups. All those 73 factors are given in table below. NO. CAUSES OF DELAY GROUP 1 Original contract duration is too short. Project 2 Legal disputes b/w various parties. Project 3 Inadequate definition of substantial completion. Project 4 In effective delay penalties. Project 5 Type of construction contracts. Project 6 Type of project bidding and award Project 7 Delay in progress payment by owner. Owner 8 Delay to furnish and deliver the site to contractor by the owner. Owner 9 Change orders by owner during construction. Owner 10 Late in revising and approving design documents by owner Owner 11 Delay in approving shop drawings and sample materials Owner 12 Poor communication and co-ordination by owner and other parties Owner 13 Slowness is decision making process by owner Owner 14 Conflicts between joint ownership of the project Owner 15 Unavailability of incentives for contractors for finishing ahead of schedule Owner 16 Suspension of work by owner Owner 17 Difficulties in financing project by contractor. Contractor 18 Conflicts in subcontractors schedule in execution of project Contractor 19 Rework due to errors during construction. Contractor 20 Poor site management and supervision by contractor Contractor 21 Poor communication and co-ordination by contractor with other parties Contractor 22 Ineffective planning and scheduling of project by contractor Contractor 23 Improper construction methods implemented by contractor. Contractor 24 Delays in subcontractors work Contractor 25 Conflicts between contractor and other parties Contractor 26 Inadequate contractors work. Contractor 27 Frequent change of subcontractors due to their insufficient work. Contractor 28 Poor qualification of the contractors technical staff Contractor 29 Delay in site mobilization. Contractor 30 Delay in performing inspection and testing by consultant Consultant 31 Delay in approving major changes in the scope of work by consultant Consultant 32 Inflexibility (rigidity) of consultant Consultant 33 Poor communication and co-ordination by consultant with other parties Consultant 34 Late in reviewing and approving design documents by consultants Consultant 35 Conflicts between consultant and design engineer. Consultant 36 Inadequate experience of dsigner. Consultant 37 Mistakes and discrepancies in design documents Design 38 Delays in producing design documents Design 39 Unclear and inadequate details in drawings Design 40 Complexity of project design Design 41 Insufficient data collection and survey before design Design 42 Misunderstanding of ownerà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s requirement by design engineer. Design 43 Inadequate design team experience Design 44 Un-use of advanced engineering design software. Design 45 Shortage of construction materials in market Material 46 Changes in material types and specification during construction Material 47 Detail in material delivery. Material 48 Damage of sorted material while they are needed urgently. Material 49 Delay in manufacturing special building material Material 50 Late procurement of materials Material 51 Late in selection of finishing materials due to availability of many types in market Material 52 Equipment breakdowns Equipment 53 Shortage of equipment Equipment 54 Low level of equipment-operatorà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s skill Equipment 55 Low productivity and efficiency of equipment Equipment 56 Lack of high technology mechanical equipment Equipment 57 Shortage of labours Labours 58 Unqualified workforce Labours 59 Nationality of labours Labours 60 Low productivity level of labours Labours 61 Personal conflict among labours Labours 62 Effects of subsurface conditions External 63 Delay in obtaining permit from government External 64 Hot weather effects on construction activities External 65 Rain effect on construction activities External 66 Unavailability of utilities in site External 67 Effect of social and cultural factors External 68 Traffic control and restriction at job site External 69 Accident during construction External 70 Differing site conditions External 71 Changes in government regulations and laws External 72 Delay in providing services from utilities External 73 Delay in performing final inspection and certification by a third party External Table 2.1 Causes of delays as per group Assaf and Hejji (2006) Their work gave a broad view over construction delays and their causes. Though their classification is quite broad, but it gives a more insight to various causes. Odeh AM and Battaineh HT (2002) presented following 8 major groups of construction delay. Client related factors which include finance, payment of billed work, interference in work, slow decision making etc. Contractor related factors include site management, improper planning, insufficient experience, improper construction methods, insufficient and unskilled work force etc. Consultant related factors include contract management, improper drawings, approval of drawings, tests at site etc. Material related factors include availability, quality and shortage. Labor and equipment factors include supply, productivity, equipment availability, failure etc. Contract factors include changed orders and mistakes and disagreements in document. Contractual relationship factors includes, disputes, negotiation, improper management of information system, improper work breakdown structure and task responsibility matrix. External factors like act of god, strikes, accidents etc. Most of the work done in field of causes of delays reflects similar causes of delays and 8 major groups. They all gave recommendations related to these factors but very few scholars suggested to forecast delay in planning stage. Khalil and Ghaftly (1999) said delay is important issue. In order to manage it more properly and to mitigate them deep investigation to this area is needed. Having idea of frequency, extent and responsibility of delay can provide insights of early planning to control these factors and improve project performance. 2.5 PERSPECTIVE FROM DIFFERENT COUNTRIES Work from Chan and Kumaraswamy (2002) from Hong Kong industry gives four major causes of delay in Hong Kong industry which are as follows: Project scope Project complexity Project Environment Management related attributes The above four factors were studied with their constituent casual factors to gain more insight and understanding of their significance. They were summarized in following figure: Figure 2.3 Summary of principal factors affecting construction durations of projects He gave another table comparing factors causing delay in construction projects in various economies. It gives an overview of common factors in these economies. It gives a clear understanding of various countries at once. Factors Causing Delay Countries where survey was conducted US UK DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TURKEY NIGERIA SAUDI ARABIA HONG KONG INDONESIA Inclement weather * * * * * Labour shortage/ Low labour productivity * * * Poor subcontractorà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s performance * * * * Variations (design change/ extra work) * * * * * Unforeseen ground conditions * * Materials shortage/ late material delivery * * * Inadequate construction planning * * * Financial difficulties * * * Delays in design work/Lack of design information * Poor site management * * * * Impractical design * Poor communication * * Inappropriate type of contract used * Lack of designerà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s experience * Inaccurate estimating * * * Table 2.2 Source: Chan and Kumarswamy (2001) Ogunlana and Promkuntong studied and compared construction industry of Thailand and other economies. Study involved delays experienced in the High Rise Building construction projects in Bangkok, Thailand. According to them Resource supply problem were most acute problems of the construction industry in boom years. Project suffered delays due to inadequate supply of cement, technical personnel were overstretched, and demands from owners to do frequent changes etc. are the major causes for delay in developing economy. Sabasivan and Soon (2007) conducted study of causes of delay in Malaysian construction industry. They conducted a survey and 150 participants were involved. They came up with 10 most important causes of delay which are as follows: Improper planning of contractor. Poor site management from contractor Inadequate experience of contractor Improper payments and finance from client Subcontractors problem Material shortage Labour supply Failure and availability of equipment Improper management information system Mistakes during construction stage. COUNTRY RESEARCHERS MAJOR CAUSES OF DELAYS Saudi Arabia Assaf et al Slow preparation and approval of shop drawings Delays in payments to contractors Changes in design/design error Shortages of labour supply Poor workmanship Lebanon Mezher et al Owner had more concerns with regard to financial issues Contractors regarded contractual relationships the most important Consultants considered project management issues to be the most important causes of delay Saudi Arabia Al-khal and Al-Ghafly Cash flow problems/financial difficulties Difficulties in obtaining permits à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã…“lowest bid win firstà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬? system Jordan Al-Moumani Poor design Changes in orders/design Weather Unforeseen site condition Late deliveries Kuwait Koushki et al Changing orders Owners financial constraints Ownerà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s lack of experience in the construction business UAE Faridi and El-Sayegh Slow preparation and approval of drawings Inadequate early planning of project Slow decision making of owners Shortage of manpower Poor site management and supervision Low productivity of manpower Saudi Arabia Assaf and Al-Hejji Change in orders by the owner during construction Delay in progress payment Ineffective planning and scheduling Shortage of labour Difficulties in financing on the part of contractor. Hong Kong Chan and Kumaraswamy Project scope Project complexity Project environment Management related attributes Florida Ahmed and Azhar Design related Construction related Financial/economical Management/ Administrative Code related Acts of God Table 2.3 Summary of previous studies of the causes of delay in construction project some data from above table is taken from Sweis et al (2008) 2.6 SUMMARY: A total of 73 factors and 8 major groups of causes of construction delays were identified through intensive literature reviews in order to consider maximum factors. These factors will be helpful in data analysis so as to forecast delay at planning stage and treat it as risk so that risk management methodologies can be implemented to delay so as to mitigate and minimizing it. These eight major categories can be brought down as shown in figure. Fig 2.4 Classification of delay groups. All major 8 groups can be brought down to 2 major groups which are Internal and external causes. Internal is further subdivided in owner, consultant, contractor and resources. Resources are further subdivided in Material, equipment and labour. Overall if we need to classify groups for the causes of delay 5 major groups covers all 73 factors they are Owner, Contractor, Consultant, Resources and External. These causes and classification will help us to rank and treat delay as a risk at planning stage so as remedial measures can be applied. Though in spite of all studies and delay causes know till now it is hard to forecast delay because its very unpredictable, we cant analyse frequency of delay due to some reason in a project. Sometimes external causes are so dominating that co-ordination of internal groups get disturbed and project faces delay.